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Abstract  
Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing 
astronomy, astrophysics and particle physics. In a recent paper on 
this topic, Brigitte Falkenburg (2012) defended that only scientific 
realism can make sense of it and that realistic beliefs constitute an 
indispensable methodological principle of research in this 
discipline. The aim of this work is to show that there exists an anti-
realist alternative to this account, along the lines of what Bas van 
Fraassen showed in his famous book The Scientific Image (1980). 
Problems and results of astroparticle physics can be understood 
from an empiricist point of view too, namely that of van Fraassen’s 
constructive empiricism, which is a more modest and metaphysics-
free alternative to scientific realism. Although constructive 
empiricism can make sense of science no worse than scientific 
realism does, van Fraassen’s goal is not to demonstrate that his 
stance is the only viable position, but just that it is not incoherent 
or proven false by his opponents (see Kusch 2015, 172). In this 
paper it will be shown that the constructive empiricist stance 
constitutes a legitimate alternative to scientific realism even when 
it gets to astroparticle physics and that it does indeed make sense 
of this new discipline, pace Falkenburg. 
Keywords: Anti-Realism, Astroparticle Physics, Constructive 
Empiricism, Falkenburg, van Fraassen. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In her “Pragmatic Unification, Observation and Realism in Astroparticle 
Physics” (2012), Brigitte Falkenburg gives a historical survey of astroparticle 
physics, an interdisciplinary field that “makes the bridge between astrophysics 
and particle physics” (p. 327); i.e., studies elementary particles of 
astronomical origin and their relation to astrophysics and cosmology. 
Allegedly, the goal of this brand new discipline is to find a unified model of 
the world, such as Newton and Einstein tried to and despite the well-known 
incompatibility between quantum theory and general relativity. 
According to Falkenburg, “the goal of finding a unified theory of physics is 
associated with the belief in genuine, universal laws of nature” (2012, 328), 
which is characteristic of scientific realism. As a matter of fact, Falkenburg 
also reckons that the whole story of astroparticle physics “only makes sense 
from a point of view of scientific realism” (p. 330). The aim of this work is to 
show that there exists an anti-realist alternative to her account, instead, along 
the lines of what Bas van Fraassen showed in his famous book The Scientific 
Image (1980). 
 
 
2. A theory-laden narrative 
 
Falkenburg’s short history of astroparticle physics is manifestly theory-
laden: “Cosmic rays were discovered in the course of investigating the 
ionisation of the air and other gases by means of the cloud chamber and 
electroscopes” (p. 328); “A spectacular astrophysical success of cosmic ray 
studies was the discovery of the 3K cosmic microwave background (CMB) in 
1964” (p. 329); “After the discovery of the W and the Z bosons in 1983, 
particle physics at the accelerators has been taking place in an innovative 
desert” (p. 330); etc. 
Of course there is nothing wrong with that, unless one thinks that talking 
about ionization, CMB, bosons and the like commits her ontologically. 
Falkenburg seems to think it is the only way this story can be told.  
The phenomenology of scientific theoretical advance may indeed be 
compared to the phenomenology of exploration and discovery in other fields, 
says van Fraassen, “and it is also appropriate to talk in this fashion while 
immersed in the theoretical picture that guides the actual scientific work” 
(1980, 74). But this does not mean that one cannot step back and reflect, in 
order to see if such a point of view on scientific activity is the only legitimate 
one - and if one is actually committed to believing in the existence of the 
entities postulated by the theories she relies on. 
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Admittedly, we all are “immersed in a language which is thoroughly 
theory-infected, living in a world [our] ancestors of two centuries ago could 
not enter” (p. 81). For instance, it may very well be the case that we have no 
adequate way to describe a certain box, and the role it plays in our world, 
except as a VHF receiver, says van Fraassen. From this, however, it does not 
necessarily follow that we believe that “the concept of very high frequency 
electromagnetic waves corresponds to an individually identifiable element of 
reality. Concepts involve theories and are inconceivable without them (…). 
But immersion in the theoretical world-picture does not preclude ‘bracketing’ 
its ontological implications” (ibid.).  
Now, science is indubitably not a mere role-playing game,1 still a scientist 
must not let herself be ‘pushed too far’ by the immersion in the world of 
science and by the highly-theory-laden language used in the context of the 
scientific practice. It is in fact possible “even after total immersion in the 
world of science to (…) limit one’s epistemic commitment while remaining a 
functioning member of the scientific community - one who is reflective, and 
philosophically autonomous as well” (van Fraassen 1980, 83).2 
A way to do that - and to avoid reifying whatever could not be defined 
away in a logical-positivist-like reconstruction of the language of science (see 
van Fraassen 1980, 44) - is by identifying a scientific theory not with a set of 
axioms and theorems, but rather with a class of mathematical models, as van 
Fraassen suggests when he defends a ‘semantic approach’ to theories in 
alternative to the so-called ‘syntactic view’. Focusing on mathematics, instead 
of on language, makes it easier to resist hypostatization of any sort. 
Accordingly, van Fraassen suggests that theories need not be true to be 
good, but ‘only’ empirically adequate, which means that all appearances (i.e. 
structures that can be described in experimental and measurement reports) 
must be isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model - that is, certain 
parts of the model must correctly describe (solely) the observable phenomena 
(see 1980, 64). Asserting a theory to be true, instead, means affirming that it 
                                                     
1 “It is not a game: these practices are part of what makes our world a coherent, useful 
and, even, the sometimes friendly, sometimes inimical place that it is” (Seager 1995, 477). 
2 William Seager reckons that van Fraassen’s notion of ‘theoretical immersion’ is too 
language-oriented (or theory-oriented) and might fail to explain the sense of conviction that 
stems from scientific practice. He prefers, in alternative, the concept of ‘virtual reality’: “if we 
replace theoretical immersion with virtual reality, perhaps we can explain the sense of 
conviction without endorsing the reality of the micro-world. Conviction stems from immersion 
in a system of imaging devices and instrument-aided practices that project one into a plausible 
micro-world” (Seager 1995, 474). Of course this substitution is perfectly tuned with 
constructive empiricism, the view of science that van Fraassen proposed in The Scientific 
Image: “I argue that immersion is more analogous to entering a virtual reality than to 
learning a language. This metaphor assimilates instrument-based practice as well as 
theoretical debate and explanation, and can provide an anti-realist view of our micro-
practices consonant with constructive empiricism” (p. 459). 
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has a model “which is a faithful replica, in all detail, of our world” (van 
Fraassen 1980, 68-69). Now, accepting a theory as empirically adequate 
requires a leap of faith too, of course, since we will never know whether this is 
the case. “Nevertheless there is a difference: the assertion of empirical 
adequacy is a great deal weaker than the assertion of truth, and the restraint 
to acceptance delivers us from metaphysics” (van Fraassen 1980, 69). 
This is the point of empiricism, in talks about science: it is possible to make 
sense of this activity without relying on metaphysics. At the end of the day, 
what a scientist actually observes, when she detects micro-particles, is a silver-
grey line in a cloud chamber or some numerical value in a gauge.3 According 
to van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, those are the appearances that must 
fit into a model of an empirically adequate theory. The postulated entities 
might fit into it or not, but we will never know.  
 
 
3. What kind of realism? Van Fraassen’s 
formulation of scientific realism and his 
empiricist alternative 
 
In his A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism (2007), Anjan Chakravartty 
shrewdly notes: “Some think there are as many versions of scientific realism 
as there are scientific realists. That is probably a conservative estimate! There 
are probably as many versions of realism as there are realists and 
antirealists” (p. xii). Falkenburg invokes more than one version, in her paper: 
entity realism, causal realism, the belief in laws of nature, realism about the 
phenomena and so on. “In the practice of physics - she writes - many facets of 
scientific realism coexist, and the realistic beliefs associated with them differ 
in being stronger or weaker” (2012, 341).  
She also adds that in astroparticle physics some strong realistic beliefs are 
kept and others are weakened. In this field of study, in fact, 
 
a firm realism about entities, phenomena, their causes, and genuine laws of 
nature comes together with an instrumentalist attitude towards the models of cosmic 
sources and the mechanisms of emission and acceleration of cosmic rays. For 
example, no physicist believes that the estimation of the different contributions to the 
                                                     
3 As scientific realists admit too, of course. Here is a passage from Dudley Shapere: “if the 
information comes in the radio region of the electromagnetic spectrum, or via weak 
interactions, it must be transformed into electromagnetic information in the visual 
wavelengths, or into audible clicks, or into readable printout, or the like” (Shapere 1982, 508). 
Therefore, “as constructive empiricism has it, there is nothing incoherent in the thought that 
we find out by inference, not observation, ‘how unobservable things are’” (Kusch 2015, 179). 
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‘all particle spectrum’ (…) is a true model. For obvious reasons, it is considered to 
be just a crude, tentative idealization (2012, 342). 
 
 
Nonetheless, Falkenburg insists that the practice of physics depends on 
scientific realism. “The belief in natural kinds and genuine laws of nature is an 
indispensable methodological principle of research in this field” (Falkenburg 
2012, 343). Falkenburg also reckons that entity realism, causal realism and the 
like are all features of what can generically be called ‘scientific realism’ and 
that this entails the belief in the existence of particles, fields, forces, laws of 
nature, etc. In addition, she also considers that physics aims at investigating 
causes and that some models of astroparticles physics are taken as true. Then 
perhaps she agrees with van Fraassen’s formulation of scientific realism: 
“Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world 
is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true” 
(1980, 8).4 
Van Fraassen shares with the realists the opinion that the language of 
science must be taken at face value. Theories are not metaphors. When a 
scientist talks about electrons, she means exactly those subatomic particles we 
all heard about. Yet, a literal interpretation of the language of science does not 
entail the belief that these entities exist. As a matter of fact, according to the 
Dutch philosopher, “science aims to give us theories which are empirically 
adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is 
empirically adequate” (1980, 12) – which is exactly the statement of his anti-
realist position, namely constructive empiricism. 
How does a constructive empiricist reply to Falkenburg’s claim that the 
practice of physics depends on scientific realism and that only a realist account 
can make sense of astroparticle physics? Note that van Fraassen thinks that his 
anti-realist position “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, 
than realism does” (1980, 73) - and without inflationary metaphysics.  
In science, theory and experimentation go hand in hand. According to van 
Fraassen, 
 
the intimately intertwined development of theory and experimentation is 
intelligible from an empiricist point of view. For theory construction, experimentation 
has a twofold significance: testing for empirical adequacy of the theory as developed 
so far, and filling in the blanks, that is, guiding the continuation of the construction, 
                                                     
4 Van Fraassen regards his formulation of scientific realism as quite minimal and adds that 
it “can be agreed to by anyone who considers himself a scientific realist” (1980, 8). He gets to 
it, in fact, after scrutinizing how important self-declared scientific realists, such as Wilfrid 
Sellars, Hilary Putnam and Richard Boyd, characterize this view on science. Other authors, 
however, criticized van Fraassen’s formulation, considering it too strong (see Sicha 1992, 522-
523). Yet, Falkenburg seems to invoke an even stronger version of realism, therefore she 
should not have any problems with van Fraassen’s characterization. 
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or the completion, of the theory. Likewise, theory has a twofold role in 
experimentation: formulation of the questions to be answered in a systematic and 
compendious fashion, and as a guiding factor in the design of the experiments to 
answer those questions. In all this we can cogently maintain that the aim is to obtain 
the empirical information conveyed by the assertion that a theory is or is not 
empirically adequate (1980, 74).  
 
This applies to astroparticle physics too. Or so I argue. 
 
 
4. Astroparticle physics, a constructive 
empiricist account 
 
In her paper, Falkenburg puts forward a short historical survey of this 
discipline that aims at investigating cosmic rays in order to make the bridge 
from subatomic particles to cosmic sources.5  
“In making the bridge from subatomic particles to cosmic sources - she 
writes -, astroparticle physics employs (…) realistic beliefs, (…) such as 
causal realism and the belief in natural kinds and their properties” (2012, 
328). Not only does Falkenburg think that physicists in this field hold realist 
beliefs, however, but also that these constitute an indispensable 
methodological principle of research in astroparticle physics (see p. 343).  
One might wonder how she knows that “the physicists who discovered the 
cosmic rays considered them to be real entities of nature, or natural kinds, 
which have the power to cause observable phenomena in the experimental 
devices” (p. 330). But even if this was the case - while, at the same time, we 
should not forget that important physicists in the history of this discipline were 
anti-realist, such as Duhem, Mach, Poincaré, Hertz (to some extent), Bohr (of 
course), to name just a few - does this suffice to conclude that a realist attitude 
                                                     
5 Falkenburg regards the discovery of the 3K cosmic microwave background (CMB) in 
1964 as a spectacular success of cosmic ray studies (see p. 329). CMB is electromagnetic 
radiation, however, which means that it is composed by photons. Being so, it is not completely 
clear whether it can legitimately be considered as part of the study of cosmic rays - all the 
more so since Falkenburg seems to consider them as particles in the classical sense of the 
word - and if there exists a general agreement, among astroparticle scientists, on including 
CMB in their research field. In the affirmative case, we see no reason why photons of any 
other energy level should not be contemplated; but then, one might wonder, are telescopic 
observations in any band of the electromagnetic spectrum part of the astroparticle-physics 
practice too? (I thank Dr Alberto Vecchiato, of the Osservatorio Astrofisico di Torino-INAF, 
for elucidating, in a recent e-mail message, on the matter of CMB and cosmic rays). 
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is necessary (or even an indispensable methodological principle of research) in 
astroparticle physics?6 
Van Fraassen has shown that the answer is negative.7 Falkenburg in fact 
said that cosmic rays were ‘discovered’ in 1964, but also remembered that 
CMB had been predicted by Gamow in 1948 (see p. 329). A constructive 
empiricist might then reply that the story of the ‘discovery’ of cosmic rays can 
be re-told, much less glamorously, as that of an observable phenomenon that 
simply fit the model of a pre-existing theory - note that Falkenburg admits that 
what is actually seen are observable phenomena in the experimental devices. 
What Penzias and Wilson observed was a numerical value displayed by a 
voltmeter that did not fit their initial prediction (model) - they did not observe 
‘radiation’.8 Since the theory they were relying on appeared not to be 
empirically adequate, they looked for another one and found that a group at 
Princeton had predicted that there would be residual microwave background 
radiation left over from the Big Bang. Their observation fit the theory the 
group in Princeton was willing to test.9 
Let’s consider another case mentioned by Falkenburg. According to her, the 
origin of astroparticle physics might be dated back to the first years of last 
century, when Victor Hess measured the ionization of the air and realized that 
it is much stronger in the height than at the ground – something that the Italian 
physicist Domenico Pacini had done before, actually. She then added: “By 
proving the extra-terrestrial origin of this phenomenon, Millikan identified 
cosmic rays as its cause” (Falkenburg 2012, 328). Again, what Millikan 
actually did, a constructive empiricist might rebut, was testing the empirical 
adequacy of a theory about the ionization of the air (his initial intent was to 
disprove Hess and Kolhörster’s ‘discovery’); eventually, he ended up ‘filling 
the blanks’ present in it - he even coined the locution ‘cosmic rays’. One just 
                                                     
6 One might also wonder whether, supposing that the majority of the physicists, in any 
field of the discipline, exhibited realist attitudes, this would constitute an argument in support 
of scientific realism. It does not, in fact. 
7  He was not referring specifically to astroparticle physics, of course. But his point applies 
to it too, as we will see. 
8 “The constructive empiricist will argue that the micro-world remains a mere virtual 
reality because there is no access to the micro-world except via the devices and practices (and 
theories) that project us into that world and thus no way to bring the putative micro-world into 
direct connection with human senses. There is no ground truth against which to measure our 
interpretations of the images delivered to us by our various instruments” (Seager 1995, 475). 
9 Compare the following passage from The Scientific Image, where van Fraassen talks 
about Robert Millikan’s famous oil drop experiment: “in this case, theory construction 
consists in experimentation. And while it may be natural to use the terminology of discovery to 
report Millikan's results, the accurate way to describe it is that he was writing theory by 
means of his experimental apparatus. In a case such as this one, experimentation is the 
continuation of theory construction by other means. The appropriateness of the means follows 
from the fact that the aim is empirical adequacy” (p. 77). The same could be said apropos of 
Penzias and Wilson’s ‘discovery’. 
Alessio Gava 
 
28 
 
needs to read again van Fraassen’s abovementioned passage about the 
intertwined development of theory and experimentation to see that Millikan’s 
‘discovery’ of cosmic rays is perfectly intelligible from an empiricist point of 
view too. 
The same goes, of course, for this other passage from Falkenburg’s short 
history of astroparticle physics: “All the predictions of the standard model of 
particle physics were confirmed at accelerator experiments, including the 
recent detection of the Higgs particle at the LHC” (2012, 329). One might 
reply that in this case theory dictated the formulation of the questions to be 
answered and acted as a guiding factor in the design of the experiments to 
answer those questions, while the experiments confirmed that the standard 
model of particle physics has not proved to be empirically inadequate so far – 
which is the most one can say about any theory. 
The same applies to the other ‘discoveries’ or confirmations of predictions 
mentioned by Falkenburg in her paper.10 Compare the following passage: 
 
Atomic physics was developing slowly, as a theory, and at each stage, many blank 
spaces had to be left in the theory. Rather than fill such a blank with a conjectured 
answer, as hypothesis, and then testing the hypothesis, one carries out an experiment 
that shows how the blank is to be filled if the theory is to be empirically adequate. 
Then it is filled, and the theory construction has got one more step forward, and soon 
there are new consequences to be tested and new blanks to be filled. This is how 
experimentation guides the process of theory construction, while at the same time the 
part of the theory that has already been constructed guides the design of the 
experiments that will guide the continuation (van Fraassen 1980, 75). 
 
Van Fraassen’s empiricist reconstruction of the development of atomic 
physics can be transposed in toto to astroparticle physics. Or so I argue. 
In light of this, since van Fraassen’s empiricist account of the intertwined 
development of theory and experimentation seems to be able to offer an 
alternative to Falkenburg’s realist-biased history of astroparticle physics, then 
her belief that the whole story of this discipline “only makes sense from a point 
of view of scientific realism” (2012, 330) perhaps is not well-founded. 
Particularly, the claim that “the belief in natural kinds and genuine laws of 
nature is an indispensable methodological principle of research in this field” 
(p. 343) should be qualified, because astroparticle physics, as well as other 
                                                     
10 And to the ‘pragmatic strategies of unification’ Falkenburg describes in section three of 
her paper as well. It is worth remembering, since Falkenburg frequently mentions the ‘belief in 
laws of nature’ - which means the belief that the same laws of physics hold inside and outside 
the laboratory, in every region of the universe - that this is nonunanimous among physicists – 
as she also admits recalling Mach’s notorious instrumental attitude with respect to the concept 
of ‘law of nature’. In Laws and Symmetry (1989) van Fraassen argued that “there is no useful 
role for the notion of a law of nature. But there is an essentially different concept which can 
do some of the same work: that of symmetry” (Morton 1993, 408). Which means that there 
exist an empiricist alternative to Falkenburg’s ‘methodological unification strategies’ too. 
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fields of study and research, can advance even if researchers in this area 
maintain an ‘agnostic’ attitude with respect to the entities postulated by the 
theories that constitute the ‘background knowledge’ they rely on – in fact, 
doesn’t astroparticle physicists keep an instrumentalist attitude towards the 
models of cosmic sources and the mechanisms of emission and acceleration of 
cosmic rays (see Falkenburg 2012, 342)? (And doesn’t this admission clash 
with the claim that the belief in natural kinds and genuine laws of nature is an 
indispensable methodological principle of research in astroparticle physics?) 
What van Fraassen maintains is that scientists have, in general, be it in 
physics or in any other area, a certain picture of the world in mind and it is 
natural and appropriate to stick to it - or immerse into it, as van Fraassen 
would say -, even from a linguistic point of view, while doing their job. They 
don’t need to believe that this picture is a faithful representation of the world, 
however, since when it gets to unobservable entities there is no way of 
empirically verifying its veridicality – this means that one might think “the 
world apparently works as if…” and suspend the judgement about whether this 
is really the case. In other words, one can maintain an agnostic/instrumental 
attitude with respect to that part of the picture that allegedly represents the 
unobservable portion of the world and focus instead on the part that is a 
candidate for the direct representation of the observable phenomena. 
Even in the case of a scientist with a realist creed, one can always describe 
her activity as a quest for empirically adequate models of the world. Whatever 
her opinion about what she is doing, in fact, it can always be reduced to that. 
Besides, this is a more ‘empirically adequate’ way of describing scientific 
activity than as a search for some kind of ‘truth’ – which is the reason why van 
Fraassen reckons that his anti-realist position “makes better sense of science, 
and of scientific activity, than realism does” (1980, 73). The rest is 
metaphysical surplus.  
Still, van Fraassen’s aim is not to deem scientific realism or anyone with 
realist inclinations as irrational. Scientific realism is a rational description of 
the scientific enterprise. But it is not the only possible one. Constructive 
empiricism is a more modest and metaphysics-free alternative, which can 
make sense of science no worse than scientific realism does - or even better, in 
van Fraassen’s opinion. There is no pretention of phasing realism out: “it is 
important to keep in mind that van Fraassen regards ‘constructive empiricism’ 
as one of several possible ‘stances’: his goal is to show that his stance is not 
incoherent or proven false by his opponents; his goal is not to demonstrate 
that it is the only viable position” (Kusch 2015, 172).  
If, on the other hand, constructive empiricism succeeds, as it does, in 
establishing as an alternative to scientific realism, then asserting that the whole 
story of astroparticle physics “only makes sense from a point of view of 
scientific realism” (Falkenburg 2012, 330) fails to do justice to van Fraassen’s 
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view on science – and to astroparticle physics itself. Not to mention that the 
claim that scientific realism constitutes an indispensable methodological 
principle of research in this discipline (see Falkenburg 2012, 343) simply 
proves to be wrong.  
 
 
5. On van Fraassen’s ‘immersion in the 
theoretical world-picture’ 
 
Stanislavsky method is a highly famous and influential system of dramatic 
training developed by the Russian actor, producer, and theoretician Konstantin 
Stanislavsky between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. 
When an actor uses it, her onstage actions and reactions appear as if they were 
a part of the real world rather than a make-believe one.  
Mutatis mutandis, this is analogous to what van Fraassen has in mind when 
he talks of “total immersion (for practical purposes) in the theoretical world-
picture” (1980, 80). William Seager reckons that the concept of ‘virtual 
reality’ is even more adequate and writes: “Someone engaged in what I called 
our micropractices cannot take the distanced standpoint recommended by CE 
[constructive empiricism] and continue, for without immersion the practices 
make no sense” (1995, 477). This means that a scientist must engage in an 
experiment or a research as if  the world actually corresponded to the 
theoretical world-picture she has in mind or to a model of the theory she wants 
to test, on pain of not succeeding in her job. But, again, this does not commit 
her ontologically (or epistemically). The scientist might actually believe that 
the theoretical world-picture she has in mind is a faithful representation of the 
real world, but she might choose to ‘bracket’ the ontological implications of 
her immersion instead – and this is a quite obvious difference with drama in 
the analogy above, since no actor believes that the real world is that depicted 
by the play she is working in. 
When Falkenburg talks about bosons, gamma rays and the like, 
 
such objects have (…) passed every test for being truly in the micro-world just as 
they appear to be. But such tests are all internal to the virtual world itself. This is why 
van Fraassen can, and indeed must, say: ‘when a realist gives a consciously and 
deliberately naive description of what happens in an experiment or observation, I do 
not, of course, want to dispute a single one of his assertions on its own ground’ 
(1985, 297). Leaving aside the rhetorical tone of this remark, we can see what forces 
it. There is no plausible refutation of realism from within the complex and beautifully 
articulated virtual reality which supports the conviction that micro-objects exist, and 
exist as imaged. But there is a way to step back from the virtual world and 
understand the practices and convictions of its champions in a way that is 
ontologically neutral (Seager 1995, 476). 
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Within the ‘complex and beautifully articulated’ virtual reality constituted 
by the theoretical world-picture, “in which (…) theory is what guides the use of 
terms and the allowed inferences” (van Fraassen 1980, 92) - and not only, as 
Seager remarked -, the assertion that scientific realism constitutes an 
indispensable methodological principle of research makes sense if interpreted 
à la Seager. As the Canadian philosopher said, someone engaged in scientific 
practice cannot step back and reflect while doing her job, for without a ‘van 
Fraassian’ theoretical immersion such practices make no sense. This means 
that, within Seager’s ‘virtual reality’ - the realists’ own ground where van 
Fraassen does not intend to dispute a single one of their assertions (see van 
Fraassen 1985, 297) -, one must act as a realist would do. Outside, back to the 
actual world, however, one can dismiss the realist bias with no further ado. 
Falkenburg’s claim about the alleged indispensability of scientific realism as a 
methodological principle cannot in fact be endorsed - and does not seem to 
make sense - tout court. 
 
 
6. The goal of physics 
 
“The goal of physics is to explain the effects from their causes”, writes 
Falkenburg (2012, 336). Of course this is a legitimate point of view on the aim 
of this important discipline, but it is no more legitimate than the constructive 
empiricist alternative put forward by van Fraassen, according to which the aim 
of science - and thus of physics too - is ‘only’ to give us empirically adequate 
theories (see 1980, 12).  
According to the author of The Scientific Image, the problem with the 
realist stand is that “an unlimited demand for explanation leads to a demand 
for hidden variables, which runs contrary to at least one major school of 
thought in twentieth-century physics” (van Fraassen 1980, 23) - not to mention 
that “as Duhem already emphasized, the very search for new and deeper 
empirical regularities becomes couched in theoretical language” (p. 73).11 Our 
point here, however, is not to try and underline the problems a supporter of a 
realist stance must cope with, but again to rebut Falkenburg’s claim that 
                                                     
11 As van Fraassen recalls, right at the beginning of his seminal book, “the opposition 
between empiricism and realism is old, and can be introduced by illustrations from many 
episodes in the history of philosophy. The most graphic of these is perhaps provided by the 
sense of philosophical superiority the participants in the early development of modern science 
felt toward the Aristotelian tradition. In that tradition, the realists held that regularities in the 
natural phenomena must have a reason (cause, explanation), and they sought this reason in 
the causal properties, constituting what they called the substantial forms or natures, of the 
substances involved in natural processes. The nominalists, who denied the reality of these 
properties, were in the position of having to reject such requests for explanation” (1980, 1). 
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scientific realism is the only viable position when it gets to astroparticle 
physics. 
 
From the medieval debates, we recall the nominalist response that the basic 
regularities are merely brute regularities, and have no explanation. So here the 
antirealist must similarly say: that the observable phenomena exhibit these 
regularities, because of which they fit the theory, is merely a brute fact, and may or 
may not have an explanation in terms of unobservable facts ‘behind the phenomena’- 
it really does not matter to the goodness of the theory, nor to our understanding of the 
world (van Fraassen 1980, 24). 
 
If one’s description of scientific activity is based on the assumption that the 
goal of science is finding out the causes of the regularities in natural 
phenomena, then it comes as no surprise that she considers scientific realism 
as the only philosophical position able to make sense of it. But there always 
exists a nominalist alternative, as old as science itself. Falkenburg’s 
assumption on the aim of physics is definitely not a conceptual truth. 
Constructive empiricism is an alternative to scientific realism, spelt out exactly 
in terms of the aim of science, which can make sense of this human enterprise 
- and therefore of astroparticle physics as well - no worse than the latter does. 
 
 
7. Cosmic messengers 
 
According to Falkenburg, “the physicists consider cosmic rays to be 
messenger particles that carry information about cosmic sources and 
propagate this information to the earth, where it is read out by the physicists” 
(2012, 336). They allegedly mediate between the cosmic sources and the 
detectors on earth (see p. 338). The concept of ‘messenger particles’, however, 
is not a theoretical one, but just “an informal heuristic tool that helps to 
reconstruct the causal story of cosmic rays” (ibid.). Still, Falkenburg adds, it 
“only makes sense from a realistic point of view” (p. 337), for it “paves the 
way to more detailed theoretical explanations of cosmic rays, their causes, and 
their effects” (ibid.). 
She finds an easy parallel in Dudley Shapere’s notion of observation, 
according to which “observation boils down to the transfer of physical 
information” (Falkenburg 2012, 338). Shapere’s account, however, is 
admittedly theory-laden: “what the astrophysicist (and I) have been referring 
to as ‘observation’ in the solar neutrino experiment obviously involves a great 
deal of inference” (Shapere 1982, 517). It is then clear that the “use of the term 
‘observation’ in reference to that experiment departs from ordinary and 
philosophical usages which associate observation epistemically with 
perception” (1982, 485), as Shapere candidly admits too.  
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Therefore, “even if we were to accept the view that their usage is perfectly 
clear, and is misleading only to the uninitiated, the possibility would still 
remain that it is nevertheless not that of either the philosopher or the ordinary 
man” (Shapere 1982, 488-489). This is probably the reason why Shapere’s 
paper, although well-known and discussed in the literature, is not that 
influential and many if not most readers of his essay have remained unmoved. 
According to Shapere, “science is, after all, concerned with the role of 
observation as evidence, whereas sense-perception is notoriously 
untrustworthy” (1982, 508). Not only, however, a “survey of the solar neutrino 
experiment indicates that prior information plays an extensive role in 
determining what counts as an ‘observation’ in that case-as astrophysicists 
use that term” (p. 505), but what works in the case of the solar neutrino might 
now work in general: “I do not claim that the analysis I have given of 
‘observation’ and its cognates as used in the context of the solar neutrino 
experiment necessarily applies, in all its details, to all cases of scientific use of 
the term” (Shapere 1982, 512). 
Shapere’s account of ‘observation’ (insofar as it is appropriate to speak this 
way) is probably not even a generalization of the verb, then, but rather the 
description of a peculiar use of it by some astrophysicists in a specific case.12 
Admittedly, “the astrophysicist’s usage is a departure from the ordinary” 
(Shapere 1982, 511), whereas ‘observation’ “in philosophical discussion (…) 
is meant to have its common use” (van Fraassen 1992, 18). 
 Then yes, Shapere’s account constitutes a “parallel to the concept of 
messenger particles used in astroparticle physics” (Falkenburg 2012, 339), but 
this comes as no surprise either, since Shapere’s essay is a case study of the 
detection of neutrinos allegedly coming from the core of the Sun.13 Both 
Falkenburg’s description of the study of cosmic rays and Shapere’s paper are 
about very similar phenomena, in both cases described from the point of view 
of scientific realism and, above all, endorsing the standpoint of astrophysicists 
with a realist creed – or, perhaps, completely ‘immersed’ in the theoretical 
picture that guides their actual scientific work. The parallelism is no striking at 
all. 
                                                     
12 Falkenburg considers Shapere’s account of observation to be both a generalized and a 
naturalistic one (see her 2012, 328). Filip Buekens and F. A. Muller attribute to van Fraassen 
and his constructive empiricism a ‘Naturalisation Thesis of Observability’ instead (see 
Buekens & Muller 2012, 92). As it has acutely been said, the term ‘naturalism’ is “one of the 
most ambiguous in the history of philosophy” (Engel 2011, 191, our translation). 
13 Since this work aims at presenting a constructive empiricist alternative to Falkenburg’s 
account of astroparticle physics, we endorse van Fraassens’s distinction between ‘observing’ 
and ‘detecting’: “Microscopes, cloud chambers, laser interferometers and other scientific 
instruments allow us to detect entities, but detection has to be carefully distinguished from 
observation. A look through a microscope does not allow us to observe directly a paramecium; 
only to observe an image of a paramecium, or to detect a paramecium” (Contessa 2006, 456). 
See also van Fraassen (1980, 16-17 and especially 2008, 93). 
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Still, it is not clear how Shapere’s work can actually support Falkenburg’s 
realist account of astroparticle physics, considering that his account of 
‘observation’ has warmed at most only a few (realist) hearts – and that it 
admittedly constitutes a departure from the ordinary use of ‘to observe’. 
Indeed, both accounts are an accurate description of some scientific practices 
‘as seen from the inside’, endorsing the point of view of the physicists while 
immersed in what Seager would call a ‘virtual reality’ - a kind of realist 
Matrix, some might say. Their narrative is completely couched in theoretical 
language and describes a world where even simple acts such as ‘observing’ an 
entity depend on some background knowledge - something that the layman 
could not perform then. 
But there exist alternatives. When Shapere writes that “what counts as 
directly observed (observable), and therefore what counts as an observation, 
is a function of the current state of physical knowledge, and can change with 
changes in that knowledge” (1982, 492, emphasis in the original), one might 
borrow van Fraassen’s words once again and ponder: “I imagine that he is 
using ‘knowledge’ lightly; he is referring to the account of underlying causal 
mechanisms implied by the accepted theories which form the background to 
the experimentation” (1980, 79).14 Even if these collateral theories are 
believed to be true, one can still describe the practices reported by Shapere as 
“the pursuit of empirical adequacy through total immersion (for practical 
purposes) in the theoretical world-picture” (van Fraassen 1980, 80) – and 
consider that what he calls an observation is nothing else than what van 
Fraassen calls detection. 
The same applies to Falkenburg. Whenever she talks of ‘knowledge’ in her 
paper, even when she calls it ‘well-established’ or ‘safe background’, one 
might interpret it as a model (or a set of models) of a theory which has been 
accepted for it has not proved to be empirically inadequate so far. Some of 
these models are developed for one specific area but prove to be useful in 
other fields too or, again, are used as a guiding factor in the design of the 
experiments (see van Fraassen 1980, 74). “The transfer of knowledge about 
particle detection went forth and back between cosmic ray studies and particle 
physics. In the 1950s, the knowledge was transferred from cosmic ray studies 
to the construction of highly sophisticated particle detectors for scattering 
experiments” (Falkenburg 2012, 329).  
When Shapere writes that “what counts as an observation, is a function of 
the current state of physical knowledge” (1982, 492, emphasis in the original) 
and Falkenburg endorses this claim, then, one might interpret it from an 
empiricist point of view, as meaning that a detection may or may not fit a pre-
existing theoretical model. Again, as van Fraassen has pointed out, in 
                                                     
14 Van Fraassen is here replying to Richard Boyd, but the same applies, mutatis mutandis, 
to Shapere’s work. 
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experimentation theory helps formulating the questions to be answered (what 
counts as an observation, for instance), besides being a guiding factor in the 
design of the experiments to answer those questions. The experiment, on the 
other hand, can help ‘filling the blanks’ if a theory is still under construction. 
“In all this we can cogently maintain that the aim is to obtain the empirical 
information conveyed by the assertion that a theory is or is not empirically 
adequate” (van Fraassen 1980, 74).  
Falkenburg also writes that “the causal stories of cosmic rays are multi-
faceted and indeed disunified” (p. 336) and explains that different models from 
astroparticle physics are used to fit the so-called ‘all particle spectrum’, adding 
that “these models give just a rough idea of what kind of cosmic sources and 
astrophysical processes may contribute to the energy spectrum of cosmic rays. 
No physicist believes that nature really is like that” (p. 337, our emphasis)15 - 
which seems particularly emblematic. 
Moreover, when she develops the parallel with the position spelled out by 
Shapere, who was convinced that the solar neutrinos might serve to directly 
observe the interior of the sun, she also adds: “As we know today, his argument 
failed. Shapere did not know that the information about the sun carried by the 
neutrinos is altered due to neutrino oscillations” (p. 339-340). It would be too 
easy to remark that one might use this very argument to point to the excessive 
and unnecessary faith (some) scientific realists put in some theories that might 
just be wrong. But one might again reason in terms of the so-called ‘semantic’ 
approach and observe that Shapere was relying on a model that later proved to 
be empirically inadequate. Falkenburg prefers concluding that “the nature of 
the messenger particles was not sufficiently known” (p. 340). The two 
alternatives are legitimate. But this is exactly our point: it is not true that 
astroparticle physics in general, or the account of ‘messenger particles’ in 
particular, only makes sense from the point of view of scientific realism. There 
exist legitimate anti-realist alternatives, even when it gets to astroparticle 
physics. Constructive empiricism is one of them. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
“In the practice of physics (…) many facets of scientific realism coexist, and 
the realistic beliefs associated with them differ in being stronger or weaker”, 
writes Falkenburg (2012, 341). Putting aside another possible remark, that it is 
not typical of a realist position to admit that belief can come in degrees (see 
                                                     
15 “In astroparticle physics, the various ‘astro’ and ‘particle’ phenomena of cosmic rays 
are put together into the ‘all particle spectrum’, which collects all measurements of cosmic 
rays and their physical properties and represents all known radiation of extraterrestrial 
origin” (Falkenburg 2012, 341). 
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van Fraassen 1980, 9, note 3), in this paper we have tried to show that while 
there might be a sense in which Falkenburg’s claim can be considered true - 
that is, when judged from inside ‘the realist Matrix’ -, it cannot be taken as 
such tout court. An anti-realist alternative, such as the one put forward by van 
Fraassen in the last decades, is feasible, even for astroparticle physics. 
In The Scientific Image, the Dutch philosopher wondered: “is the 
methodology of science and experimental design intelligible on any but a 
realist interpretation of science?” (p. 70) and defended that the intertwined 
development of theory and experimentation is perfectly intelligible from an 
empiricist point of view. The aim of this paper has been to show that, contrary 
to what Falkenburg claims, this applies to astroparticle physics as well. 
In his recent “Microscopes and the Theory-Ladenness of Experience in Bas 
van Fraassen’s Recent Work” (2015), Martin Kusch discussed van Fraassen’s 
notorious and controversial position on the matter of observation and defended 
it as a viable alternative to a realist interpretation of the output of devices such 
as the microscope. Some of Kusch’s remarks certainly apply - again, mutatis 
mutandis - to Falkenburg’s defence of scientific realism as the only position 
able to make sense of astroparticle physics and its practices. 
When she claims that “knowledge of physical phenomena, the underlying 
entities, and their properties is objective and stable” (2012, 341) or that “the 
models of astroparticle physics are taken as true whenever they are based on 
safe background knowledge” (p. 342), etc., one might borrow Kusch’s reply to 
Marc Alspector-Kelly and say:  
 
What is it that we know here? Does not this knowledge involve theoretical claims? 
And how are we to relate to them? That is, what does acceptance of the theory 
involve? (…) Does it merely amount to the claim that there is a regularity 
(invariance) between various observable phenomena brought about by the (…) 
system? Clearly, the scientific realist and the constructive empiricist will opt for 
different answers here (2015, 176-177). 
 
Falkenburg talks about bosons, cosmic rays, microwave background 
radiation and the like with ease and has every right to do so. She also thinks 
that “cosmic rays and their physical properties could be established as 
objective, stable phenomena” (2012, 328). One might observe, however, that 
her narrative “rests upon a realist epistemology of instrumentally-aided (…) 
experience; that this theory has come to shape our very phenomenology of 
instrumentally-aided sensory experience; and that this shaping explains the 
strengths of resistance to the constructive empiricist’s agnosticism” (Kusch 
2015, 168). 
Indeed, Falkenburg’s talk gives the false impression that we do not need to 
marshal arguments in defence of the belief that neutrinos and cosmic rays are 
objects or that the postulated microstructures are real (compare with Kusch 
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2015, 173). She even reckons that cosmic rays can be established as objective 
and stable phenomena, as has just been said. But whether these unobservable 
(to the naked eye) entities are well-behaved or not, is, for the constructive 
empiricist, something that we merely infer on the basis of the output of some 
device (compare with Kusch 2015, 176). 
Compare this other passage from Kusch’s paper, again directed to 
Alspector-Kelly: 
 
He does not recognize the importance and possibility of reading the results of 
science in a way that is neutral with respect to the debate between scientific realist and 
constructive empiricist. He does not take account of the possibility that certain 
formulations or interpretations of scientific theories - by scientists themselves or 
philosophers - simply presuppose without argument the truth of scientific realism. (…) 
van Fraassen is entitled to demand that the scientific evidence be rendered in a neutral 
way, and that this neutral way is precisely the constructive-empiricist interpretation 
(2015, 180). 
 
Something very similar might be said apropos of Falkenburg’s account of 
astroparticle physics. Her interpretation of the practices and experiments in 
this field does presuppose without argument the truth of scientific realism, as 
when she claims that the goal of physics is to explain the effects from their 
causes (see 2012, 336).16 I have replied that this is not straightforward at all 
and recalled that there exist alternative points of view on science and its aim. 
Van Fraassen put forward an important anti-realist one a few decades ago, 
which rejects the scientific realists’ ‘unlimited demand for explanation’, but 
sure can make sense of physics too.  
Borrowing again Kusch’s words, one might then say that none of 
Falkenburg’s arguments is launched from a platform that would be neutral 
regarding the two opposed views (compare with Kusch 2015, 181) and that it 
would be more illuminating to keep neutrality, instead (see van Fraassen 2001, 
155 and 2008, 109). It would be so since it could allow us to identify realist 
commitments as optional (see Kusch 2015, 172). Even when it gets to 
astroparticle physics. 
Let’s consider another example. Falkenburg claims that “unifying 
strategies, and in particular the heuristic concept of messenger particles, 
demonstrate that the practice of physics depends on scientific realism” (2012, 
343). But van Fraassen had already explained that “there seems to me no doubt 
that the aim of empirical adequacy already requires the successive unification 
of ‘mini-theories’ into larger ones, and that the process of unification is 
mainly one of correction and not of conjunction” (1980, 87). Unifying 
                                                     
16 Because of this, Kusch would probably reply that Falkenburg’s argument “presupposes 
the realism it seeks to establish” (2015, 181). 
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strategies are perfectly intelligible from the point of view of constructive 
empiricism. Even when analyzing them, realist commitments are optional. 
In conclusion, we can confidently say that Falkenburg’s opinion that 
without scientific realism “neither the problems nor the results of astroparticle 
physics can be understood” (2012, 343) is not well-founded. Problems and 
results of astroparticle physics can be understood from an empiricist point of 
view too, namely from that of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. Still, it 
is worth remembering that “van Fraassen is not trying to refute the scientific 
realist. All he is seeking to establish is that the constructive empiricist stance 
is not incoherent” (Kusch 2015, 172). It is our contention that he succeeded, 
even when the topic is astroparticle physics. 
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